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Abstract
In the realm of obscenity law in the United States, photography as an art form is
not on equal footing with more traditional art forms such as painting, drawing, and
sculpture. This is a latent dilemma for artistic photographers because the law itself – in
the form of state obscenity laws and the Supreme Court’s three-pronged test in Miller v.
California – does not explicitly set forth varied standards of obscenity based on artistic
medium. However, given the marginalization of photography in art history, there exists a
bias against photography as “serious art.” Furthermore, evidence of the differential
treatment of photography in areas of the law outside of obscenity affect the law’s
approach to photography within the realm of obscenity. Finally, the nature of
photography as a multi-functional medium that is perceived as capturing objective truth is
more readily offensive to the viewer because sexually explicit images seem inherently
more “real.” As a result, the photographer as artist seems to be more restricted than the
painter or sculptor when it comes to creating sexually explicit artwork. Yet if
photography is indeed a valid art form, the photographer, simply because he or she
photographs rather than paints or sculpts, should not be subjected to a higher tendency of
courts and audiences to deem a sexually explicit photograph more readily obscene than a
sexually explicit painting, drawing, or sculpture. With respect to obscenity standards,
there should be equal treatment across all artistic media.

INTRODUCTION
The intersection of art and obscenity has long been a source of intrigue in light of
the ever-changing nature of artistic movements and contemporary standards. The focus
of the heated debate, however, is seldom placed on the effect that artistic medium has on
the tendency of courts and audiences to find a particular work obscene.1 More
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See, e.g., Amy Adler, The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 205 (2000) [hereinafter Adler, Art of
Censorship] (arguing that the First Amendment offers greater protection over verbal rather than visual
expression, but not suggesting that there is varied protection over different types of visual images); Cara L.
Newman, Eyes Wide Open, Minds Wide Shut: Art, Obscenity, and the First Amendment in Contemporary
America, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 121 (2003) (charging that the First Amendment fails to adequately protect
post-modern artists but not differentiating between various artistic media); Amy Adler, Comment, PostModern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990) [hereinafter Adler, Death of
Obscenity Law] (emphasizing that the Miller standard of “serious artistic value” is obsolete in the world of
post-modern art because the new art in general rebels against that standard).

specifically, the question of whether modern forms of art such as photography are more
susceptible to obscenity charges by nature of intrinsic characteristics of the medium itself
is an interesting one left relatively unexplored.
In order to warrant the protection of the First Amendment, it appears that sexually
explicit photographs must possess an artistic value beyond that required for more
traditional forms of art. But what of the post-modern art photographer who wishes to
defy all standards and propose that something an average person might mistake as a
“non-artistic” snapshot, or a page from a pornographic magazine, is art? Is a sexually
explicit photograph somehow more likely to be found obscene than a sexually explicit
painting or sculpture? If so, then it would seem that the art photographer is more
restricted in producing sexually explicit work than the more traditional painter or
sculptor. This varied standard, though invisible on paper, is ultimately harmful to both
the photographer as artist and the advancement of photography as art. In the realm of
obscenity law, courts and audiences must strive to place photography on equal footing
with other forms of art despite the complications that arise with photography as a distinct
and often problematically literal medium for expression.
Part I of this paper will establish the initial hurdles that photography faces with
respect to First Amendment protection given the power of visual imagery and the threepronged test for obscenity set forth in Miller v. California.2 Of particular relevance is the
“serious artistic value” prong of the Millertest and the problems inherent in who is to
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413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Supreme Court ruled that state courts should look to the following
three guidelines for determining whether a work is obscene: a) whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by applicable state law; and c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. Id. at 24.
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judge as well as how one might judge whether a work, particularly a photograph that may
be construed to have a non-artistic function, constitutes “serious art.”
Part II will expand upon the obstacles inherent in artistic photography by
exploring the multi-functional nature of photography and its marginalization in art
history. The emergence of photography as an art form is a relatively modern
phenomenon that effectuates a higher standard for proving that a photograph possesses
“serious artistic value.”
Part III addresses the overall approach to photography in three distinct areas of
the law outside of obscenity: copyright, privacy, and child pornography. In each of these
areas, courts have demonstrated a bias against photography based on its inherent nature.
This biased approach to photography in other areas of the law tends to translate into the
tendency of courts to view photography differently in the realm of obscenity.
Part IV focuses on the effect of photography as a means of capturing objective
truth. Because a photograph is perceived as intrinsically more “real” than a painting or
sculpture, I argue that courts and audiences are more likely to find provocative
photographs obscene. A sexually explicit photograph that is perceived as accurately
depicting a real subject or action that took place in an actual moment of time may have a
higher probability of appealing to the “prurient interest” or of being “patently offensive.”
Combined with the problems in proving that photography has “serious artistic value,”
these tendencies render photography more readily obscene than other forms of art.
Finally, Part V looks forward to the need to effectively apply an equal standard of
obscenity across all art forms despite the limits that an artistic photographer faces in light
of the obstacles explored throughout the previous sections.
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I.

VISUAL ART AND THE MILLER TEST: INITIAL HURDLES TO FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION

As a starting point, artistic photography faces two umbrella challenges with
respect to First Amendment protection: the nature of it being a visual art, and the
difficulties inherent in determining what constitutes “serious artistic value.” These
challenges are not specific to photography as an artistic medium, though artistic
photography falls squarely into the category of forms of expression that face both
challenges. First, it is a visual art that arguably garners lesser First Amendment
protection than verbal speech.3 Second, the relevant third-prong question from Miller is
whether the photograph possesses “serious artistic value.” The definition of art, however,
and the question of who should decide what art is, are enormously controversial.4
Furthermore, contemporary artistic movements such as the Post-Modernist movement
seek to deliberately defy the notion that an artistic work be serious or possess any
traditional artistic value.5 As such, given that it is a visual art and that it is subject to the
arguably inadequate Miller standard on obscenity, artistic photography seems
disadvantaged from the start, even before engaging in a deeper discourse on obscenity
standards and varied forms of visual art.
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See Adler, Art of Censorship, supra note 1 (identifying the problem for art as part of the larger problem of
greater First Amendment protection over verbal as opposed to visual speech).
4
See generally Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805 (examining “the extent to which
the law makes aesthetic judgments” and the need for courts to recognize and “import” the complex
discourse on what constitutes art); Newman, supra note 1 at 145 (“From a critical perspective, [the notion
that good art is distinguishable from bad art] may be an impossible distinction to make because, before one
can dismiss an image or performance as ‘bad’ art or ‘non-art,’ one must know what ‘art’ is.”); Adler, Death
of Obscenity Law, supra note 1, at 1375-78 (identifying practical ways courts can determine whether a
work is art rather than trying to answer the exhausting philosophical query of what “art” is).
5
Adler, Death of Obscenity Law, supra note 1, at 1359.
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A. The Power of the Image
Visual imagery can evoke powerful emotions and reactions that render it distinct
from, or simply unparallel to, other forms of expression. The age-old expression that a
picture is worth 1,000 words finds its root in the idea that images have the ability to
communicate in a uniquely powerful and effective way. Even the Supreme Court has
suggested that images have a specific potent quality in that they act as a “short cut from
mind to mind.”6 With respect to the First Amendment, the question has been raised as to
whether it makes sense that art, in its “force beyond words, its power and its
irrationality,”7 is protected at all, given that the underlying rationale of the First
Amendment is to foster a marketplace of rational ideas.8 Additionally, there exists the
argument that visual images are somehow dangerous given their power over human
emotion and behavior.9 As Professor Amy Adler keenly observes:
“The seductive quality of artistic images, their appeal to the senses and the
emotions, has been a recurring justification in the complex and centuries-old
history of iconoclasm, censorship, and suppression of art. The voluptuousness
of art, its power beyond words, the possibility that it could be worshipped,
fetishized, or misinterpreted, paved the way for both adulation and censorship.
This view, of course, helps to explain why First Amendment law would devalue
images: by bypassing reason and appealing directly to the senses, images fail to
participate in the marketplace of ideas.”10

Photography as an art form may in fact represent the epitome of the power of the
image, particularly because a photograph is perceived as capturing and revealing an

6

West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (commenting on the power of
visual images in the context of an emblem or flag); see Adler, Art of Censorship, supra note 1 (illustrating
the value of visual images in part through discussion on the Supreme Court’s flag and flag burning cases).
7
Adler, Art of Censorship, supra note 1, at 205.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 211-213.
10
Id. at 213.
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objective truth that is that much easier for an individual to relate to.11 It would follow
that powerful, provocative, or offensive photographs might be considered more
“dangerous” images that, applying Professor Adler’s analysis, would warrant greater
censorship. Yet even when disregarding the nature and effect of artistic photography
specifically, the mere initial fact that it is a visual form of expression rather than a textual
one automatically places it on lower footing with respect to First Amendment protection.
Indeed, contemporary obscenity prosecutions have focused exclusively on visual rather
than textual material.12 Furthermore, anti-pornography writing, namely that of Catharine
MacKinnon, suggests that pornographic photography is more harmful and degrading to
women than textual pornography.13 Considering these assertions on the power of visual
imagery, photography, by nature of its being an image rather than text, faces an initial
obstacle to thwarting obscenity prosecutions.

B. The Problem of “Serious Artistic Value”
The second general obstacle artistic photography faces by nature of being an “art”
relates to the third prong of the Miller test. Even if a work of art satisfies the first two
prongs of the test, the work is not deemed obscene under Millerunless it also lacks
serious artistic value. Yet what exactly is art, and who gets to decide what it is? If art is
a means of self-expression and a critical societal and cultural medium for new ideas,
creative development, and progress, then art’s sole constant may indeed be change. As a

11

See infra Part IV.
See Adler, Art of Censorship, supra note 1, at 210; Rudolf Arnheim, The Images of Pictures and Words,
2 WORD & IMAGE 306 (Oct.-Dec. 1986).
13
See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (Harvard University Press 1993); CATHARINE
A. MCKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (Harvard University Press 1989); CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (Harvard University Press 1987).
12
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result, a single true and accurate definition of art would be ever-fleeting.14 Moreover,
reasonable minds differ on what is and is not “aesthetic” for purposes of art. Perhaps
more accurately, art is more often than not meant to defy reason entirely and appeal to
one’s passion.15 It is therefore meant to be open to interpretation depending on each
individual’s own emotional reaction.16 Furthermore, not all art is intended to be aesthetic
or even fully interpretable.17 Post-modern art, for example, derives its value from
defying past standards and expanding traditional boundaries of art, often attempting
deliberately to shock and outright offend audiences.18 Perhaps most importantly for
purposes of the current law on obscenity, not all art has “serious artistic value.”19
Therefore, First Amendment jurisprudence with respect to obscenity is riddled with the
general dilemma of how to determine what art is in the first place, and how to reconcile
the third prong of Millerwith the idea that some legitimate art may, by its very character,
purposely lack “serious artistic value.”
The problem with “serious artistic value” transcends into the realm of
photography, and it is arguably even heightened there. To the extent that photography
was not traditionally considered an “art” and is still seen today as having multiple “non-
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See Newman, supra note 1, at 155-58.
See Adler, Art of Censorship, supra note 1 at 213; Renee Linton, The Artistic Voice: Is it in Danger of
Being Silenced?, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 195 (1995) (supporting government funding of the arts and making
the opening statement that “[g]ood art moves your emotions and makes you think,” though emphasizing
that “good” art encompasses “disliked” art and that all art deserves attention and protection).
16
See Linton, supra note 13, at 195 (“Art does not have to be liked or beautiful or innocent to be art. It
must, however, be seen or heard, and it must strike your soul, your mind or both.”).
17
Id.
18
See Adler, Death of Obscenity Law, supra note 1 (denouncing the Miller test as being inadequate for
protecting Post-Modern art such as the works of Finley, Sprinkle, Mapplethorpe, and Kern, all of which
seek to rebel against traditional notions of art and therefore often shock, offend, or insult the common
public).
19
See id. at 1359 (introducing the dilemma that Miller came at a turning point in art history, and that the
new Post-Modern art rendered the third prong of the test obsolete).
15
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artistic” functions,20 it is harder to prove that provocative photographs that teeter on the
“art/non-art” distinction have “serious artistic value.” In this sense, the art photographer
is not only restricted by the same challenges regarding “serious artistic value” that
confront all other artists, but is additionally restricted by nature of being a photographer.
Though this is likely the case, the overarching problem with defining “serious artistic
value” looms over the entire picture, be it a painting, drawing, or photograph, thereby
presenting a so-called initial hurdle. Yet this difficulty in defining and judging art
constitutes only half of the problem with “serious artistic value.”
The other half of this looming issue concerns the question of who should
determine whether a work possesses “serious artistic value.” Justice Holmes’s famous
quote in the 1903 case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company21 reveals the
sentiment that it is not the role of judges to evaluate the legitimacy of art or to make
aesthetic determinations.22 Courts, however, are not always apt to pay heed to Holmes’s
admonition.23 For this reason, some judges do make themselves out to be arbiters of art,
subjecting more questionable works of art to their own whims and notions of what
warrants protection from the law.
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See infra Part II.
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
22
Id. at 251 (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations…. At the one extreme some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke.”).
23
See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 139 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (providing extensive
background on the artistic origins of the pose in question in a prominent fair use case); Miller v. United
States, 431 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1970) (ruling a photographic magazine obscene because the pictures
contained in it reflected no attempt at artistic composition); People v. Gonzales, 107 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1951)
(denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss a prosecution for violation of the state obscenity statute because
the works in question were “not even good photography” and therefore no argument could be made that
they constituted art).
21
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In Pope v. Illinois,24 the Supreme Court announced a reasonable person standard
for Miller’s third prong.25 In determining whether a work has “serious artistic value,” a
jury should therefore ask itself how a reasonable person would evaluate the work as a
whole rather than base the determination on contemporary community standards and
what an average person in a given community would think.26 While expert testimony
may be used to help the trier of fact make this determination,27 it is not required,28 and the
opinion of art experts and critics is not necessarily determinative given Pope’s reasonable
person standard.29 Furthermore, critics of the Pope majority warn that the reasonable
man standard exacerbates the difficulties that lie in the “serious artistic value” prong.30
As Justice Stevens warns in his dissent, the reasonable person standard poses a greater
threat to unpopular or misunderstood art because juries may be more inclined to neglect
the testimony of art experts, thinking a reasonable person would evaluate art differently
from an art critic.31 While art experts may use more defined analyses such as a subjective
“four-corners” test or objective “Dickey” analysis to determine whether a work possesses
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481 U.S. 497 (1987).
Id. at 501.
26
Id.
27
See, e.g., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ten Erotic
Paintings, 432 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1970) (acknowledging the weight of affidavits filed by claimants in which
art experts including critics and museum curators certified the works in question and their authors, deeming
that the works possessed artistic, historic, and anthropological merit); Tipp-It, Inc. v. Conboy, 596 N.W.2d
304, 314 (Neb. 1999) (deferring to the single expert witness’s testimony in the case to conclude that the
works lacked serious artistic value under the various expert analyses proposed); Elizabeth Hess, Art on
Trial: Cincinnati’s Dangerous Theater of the Ridiculous, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 23 1990 (reporting on the
famous trial involving Robert Mapplethorpe’s controversial works and the effectiveness of the expert
testimony in convincing the jury to acquit the Contemporary Art Center and its director).
28
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973) (regarding consideration of the works in and
of themselves sufficient for the determination of the question of obscenity).
29
See Adler, Death of Obscenity Law, supra note 1, at 1372-73 (criticizing Pope as an extremely dangerous
standard because it devalues expert testimony and therefore may further threaten sexually explicit PostModern artists).
30
Id.
31
Pope, 481 U.S. at 512 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25
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serious artistic value,32 the Pope standard subjects controversial art to more popular, and
often more limiting, concepts of art and artistic value.33
All of this suggests that, for better or worse, current First Amendment
jurisprudence and standards on obscenity render the preconceived notions and popular
perceptions of “art” by the common public extremely relevant to the analysis. This will
be particularly important in the discussion on artistic photography’s distinct impact on
audiences and how it relates to a greater likelihood that a provocative photograph will be
considered obscene.34 Sexually explicit artistic photography must therefore grapple with
a variety of issues – the fact that it is a visual art, the requirement that it meet the
problematic “serious artistic value” prong of Miller, the influence of generic public views
on art versus that of experts – even before confronting the consequences of its
characteristics as a distinct medium. It is therefore disadvantaged from the get-go. These
overarching obstacles only begin to pave the rocky road for art photographers in their
struggle for equal treatment under the First Amendment, though they are critical in their
relation to the more medium-specific explanations for why sexually explicit photography
may be more readily charged as obscene.

32

See Conboy, 596 N.W.2d at 314 (discussing the expert witness’s consideration of two analyses used by
art experts: the subjective “four-corners” test that evaluates specific criteria such as space, composition,
design, color, harmony, and form and balance; and the objective “Dickey” analysis which takes into
account where the art has been exhibited and the degree of respect and recognition in the art world that the
work or artist has attained).
33
See Newman, supra note 1, at 151 (denouncing courts’ beliefs that ordinary and reasonable men and
women are best suited to evaluate a sexually explicit work’s artistic value because the general public often
regards art with suspicion, and may therefore “condemn a work as obscene based on superficial content
alone”).
34
See infra Parts II and IV.
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II.

MIXED FUNCTIONS AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF PHOTOGRAPHY IN ART
HISTORY

In addition to the initial proposition that photography receives a lesser degree of
First Amendment protection because it is a visual art, photography faces an added layer
of obstacles to equal protection given its distinct multi-functionality and its relatively
recent emergence as an art form. The difficulties that lie in determining what constitutes
art, and more specifically, what does and does not have “serious artistic value,” are
heightened by several factors intrinsic to photography itself: the fact that photography
serves multiple non-artistic functions, the historical perception that a photograph is the
“plastic verification of a fact”35 and a mere product of a machine and chemical process,
and the marginalization by critics of the medium as an art form as compared to other art
forms.
A photograph is very often used outside of the world of art in a wide variety of
areas such as criminal evidence, science, journalism, and advertising, to name a few.36
An average person may merely take a photograph for leisure, to record memories and

35

Marias de Zayas, Photography and Photography and Artistic-Photography, in CLASSIC ESSAYS ON
PHOTOGRAPHY 125, 125 (Alan Trachtenberg, ed., Leete’s Island Books, Inc. 1980).
36
See, e.g., SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 5 (Farrar Straus and Giroux 1977) (1973) (introducing the
early uses of photography in modern states as surveillance and proof in evidence and providing discussion
on how early controversies on photography as art focused on whether it could distinguish itself from its
other functions in science and trade); JOHN TAGG, THE BURDEN OF REPRESENTATION 60, 66 (University of
Massachusetts Press 1988) (delineating the expansion of the photographic industry into advertising,
journalism, and the domestic market, and the use of photographs in medicine, evidence, and the growth of
the state); Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, Photography in Advertising, in PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE MODERN ERA 86-93
(Christopher Phillips, ed., The Metropolitan Museum of Art and Aperture 1989) (regarding photography
not primarily as an art form, but rather as a vehicle for transforming modern visual culture through fields
such as advertising); Albert Renger-Patzsch, Photography and Art, in PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE MODERN ERA
142-44 (Christopher Phillips, ed., The Metropolitan Museum of Art and Aperture 1989) (noting that
modern life would be unthinkable without photography because of its multitude of everyday functions,
including its influence through film, the illustrated press, and science); Christine Haight Farley, The
Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of Photography, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 393
(2004) (discussing the cultural theory on photography and the ways in which audiences might interpret a
photograph in a museum versus the same one used as evidence of a crime).
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special moments. It may have no formal artistic intent whatsoever. Photography in and
of itself has never been, nor will likely ever be, understood solely as “art” in the
traditional sense.37 Its historical development simply did not take shape in such a way.
In contrast, an oil painting, no matter how displeasing or avant-garde, is still a painting.
It enjoys a reputation as a traditional form of “art” that photography does not.
While this is not to say that more traditional kinds of art such as paintings have no
function outside of the world of art, the development of photography and its historically
standard classification as an “art-science” are surely distinct.38 If a photograph has
traditionally had, and will continue to have, such prominent functions outside of the
world of art,39 then the distinction between “artistic” photography and “non-artistic”
photography is that much more confusing. As previously discussed, the difficulties in
defining art and evaluating a given work for its “serious artistic value” are far-reaching
and problematic in and of themselves. With respect to photography, the proper
37

See, e.g., JOHN L. WARD, THE CRITICISM OF PHOTOGRAPHY AS ART (University of Florida Press 1970)
(criticizing pictorialism, a school of thought on the analysis of photography as art, for its claim that
ph
otographs can be judged by the same standard as paintings, drawings, and prints, because the standard is
not broad enough to fit all cases); Erno Kallai, Painting and Photography, in PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE
MODERN ERA 94 (Christopher Phillips, ed., The Metropolitan Museum of Art and Aperture 1989)
(comparing the mediums of painting and photography and expressing disappointment with the mixture of
art and mechanical technology).
38
See, e.g., MARY WARNER MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY AND ITS CRITICS: A CULTURAL HISTORY, 1839-1900
57-66 (Cambridge University Press 1997) (describing the association of photography with progress in
science and technology during the invention’s first decade); SONTAG, supra note 36 at 126 (stressing that
the earliest controversies surrounding photography concerned whether it could establish itself as “distinct
from a merely practical art, an arm of science, and a trade); Peter Henry Emerson, Hints on Art, in CLASSIC
ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 99 (Alan Trachtenberg, ed., Leete’s Island Books, Inc. 1980) (criticizing the
standard definition of photography as an art-science and recommending varied analyses for artistic,
scientific, and commercial photography); Erno Kallai, Pictorial Photography, in PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE
MODERN ERA 116, 116 (Christopher Phillips, ed., The Metropolitan Museum of Art and Aperture 1989)
(supporting the formula of comparison between painting as a “personal and psychological encapsulation of
form” and photography as the “outcome of a mechanical and chemical process”).
39
See CHRISTOPHER DUVERNET, PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 74-109 (Self-Counsel Press 1991) (1986)
(summarizing for the professional photographer the relevant legal issues that affect uses of photography in
distinct areas such as advertising, news, court, and professional competitions); MARIEN, supra note 38, at
45 (calling the lack of definition of photography a benefit given its ability to be comprehended in the public
experience across all realms, including family life, commerce, government, war, education, science, and
art).
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determination of whether a “reasonable person” would appreciate a photograph as serious
art is further burdened by the multi-functional nature of the medium itself.
Although photography is generally accepted today as a branch of high art, it has
historically been marginalized as a lesser art form compared to painting and other
traditional forms of art.40 This marginalization is, in a sense, intuitive: practically anyone
can take a photograph. It involves, in the most primitive sense, the clicking of a button.
While today the majority of the population would recognize that although nearly anyone
can take a photograph, not anyone can be a professional art photographer, an artist’s
sexually explicit photograph that defies aesthetic and more widely-accepted technical
standards in the Post- Modernist fashion may very likely still be denied any recognition of
serious artistic value. In applying Pope’s reasonable person standard to the value prong
of the obscenity test, the relative ease of taking a photograph very believably comes into
play. If a sexually explicit photograph does not look like “art” in the intuitive aesthetic
sense, and it is much easier to snap a picture rather than paint one, then is it really art?
Does the inherent automatism of photography somehow render it less deserving of
serious artistic value? A version of this thought process may very well enter a juror’s
mind, particularly if the photographic work does not appeal to traditional aesthetic
notions of beauty or reflect an established technical prowess.41

40

See generally SONTAG, supra note 36, at 115-149 (providing an intriguing discourse on the relation of
photography to art and knowledge and outlining the various ways photography as a form of art defended
itself); Kallai, supra note 38, at 116-17 (comparing a photographic still life to a similar painting and finding
that the photograph was inferior from a technical standpoint and generally more limited as a visual
medium); Renger-Patzsch, supra note 36, at 142 (“There was a time when one looked over one’s shoulder
with an ironical smile at the photographer, and when photography as a profession seemed almost invariably
a target for ridicule.”).
41
Cf. Hess, supra note 27 (relaying how the art expert for the defense convinced the jury that Robert
Mapplethorpe’s works were not obscene because of their formalist qualities). While the defense’s art
expert in the famous trial may have convinced the jury of the works’ serious artistic value using an analysis
based on artistic technique, the question is whether an artist attempting to drastically push the limits of
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The era following its invention in 1839 in which photography had to defend itself
as a form of fine art was relatively short,42 though the defenses brought forth were
distinct to photography’s inherent nature:
Against the charge that photography was a soulless, mechanical
copying of reality, photographers asserted that it was a vanguard revolt
against ordinary standards of seeing, no less worthy an art than
painting.43

Indeed, the very basis for a modern-day juror’s tendency to deem a photograph as less
deserving of serious artistic value replicates that which emerged during photography’s
early criticism as mechanical rather than artistic. The automatism of photography, the
relative ease of taking a photograph, and its dependence on a machine made critics
suspicious of its artistic value.44 As the English critic John Ruskin lamented regarding
the invasion of photography into the realm of art, “Next, you will have steam organs and
singers, and turn on your cathedral service.”45
Throughout the course of photography’s development in art history, practitioners
themselves felt pressured to defend their work and prove its value. The influential
nineteenth and twentieth-century artistic photographer Alfred Stieglitz himself initially
took on an additional interest in painting in part because he feared that there was not

photography as art by disregarding current considerations of technique would automatically be accused of
producing pornography because the reasonable person might be influenced by the ease with which a
photograph is taken and subsequently dismiss the work for any artistic value.
42
SONTAG, supra note 36 at 115 (“The era in which photography was widely attacked (as parricidal with
respect to painting, predatory with respect to people) was a brief one…. [B]y 1854, a great painter,
Delacroix, graciously declared how much he regretted that such an admirable invention came so late.”).
43
Id. at 126.
44
See, e.g., MARIEN, supra note 38, at 58-60. Photography was further marginalized in relation to other
pre-existing forms of art because many of the artists who did choose to adopt photography and “jump ship”
were second-rate artists to begin with. Farley, supra note 36, at 419.
45
Id. (quoting Ruskin, Works, vol. 22, p. 510, n.8).
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enough good photography to fill his famous magazine and gallery.46 However, as an avid
leader in the movement for recognition of photography as a valid art form, he believed
that exhibiting paintings and photographs side-by- side might help define photography
more effectively and in turn help it rise to an equal status among the arts.47 In sum,
artistic photographers have struggled to find their place in the world of art. While few
today would dispute that photography can be an art, this unique medium does not enjoy
the same treatment as other forms of art given its troubled history. Considering the
marginalization of photography in art history and its inherent multi-functionality, it is
likely that courts and audiences will struggle in their determination of the serious artistic
value of questionable photographic works to a greater degree than they would for other
forms of art that do not share the same past.

III.

THE EFFECT OF ARTISTIC MEDIUM ON LEGAL BIASES: THE LAW’S DISTINCT
APPROACH TO PHOTOGRAPHY OUTSIDE OF OBSCENITY

While statutes and courts have not explicitly allocated a varied obscenity standard
based on artistic medium, nor ever expressly indicated that photography shall be treated
as a lesser art more likely to be considered obscene, certain areas of the law outside of
obscenity law suggest an overall legal bias against photography. These areas help reveal
the general approach to photography by courts and lawmakers as being distinct from
other vehicles for expression. Evidence of bias in the realms of copyright, privacy, and
child pornography law demonstrates the likelihood that this distinct approach to
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photography transcends those realms into the realm of obscenity law. It helps support the
proposition that photography is simply treated differently by the law. This unfavorable
bias has far-reaching consequences for art photographers who produce sexually explicit
work.

A. Photography and Copyright Law
The intersection of photography and copyright law came to a head in the
prominent 1884 Supreme Court case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.48
While the case is well-known for its determinations about the originality standard central
to copyright law, what is most important and relevant is that the case more specifically
resolved the issue of whether a photograph could be deemed the product of an author and
therefore receive copyright protection in the first place.49 The details of this case
highlight the history of photography’s troubled development as an art form. Given
photography’s mechanical nature and the charge that a photograph is merely the product
of a soulless machine, the defendant in this case argued that the work was not that of an
author and that it therefore failed the basic requirement for copyright protection.
Essentially, this argument rode on the very criticisms of photography that provided the
basis for its struggle to establish itself as art.50
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111 U.S. 53 (1884).
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The mere fact that the differences between photography and other forms of art
were so prominently considered in Burrow-Giles shows that there was a tendency for the
Court to take an alternative approach to photography, even though the plaintiff in the case
prevailed. While the Court ultimately ruled that the work, the famous portrait of Oscar
Wilde, was indeed the work of an author rather than a machine, what is significant is that
it used an approach separate from that which it would have used to find authorship in a
painting or other form of art.51 The necessity of taking the “human trace” approach to
justifying copyright of a photograph rather than the more traditional labor or innovation
justifications used to support copyright of paintings and other forms of art reveals that
despite the outcome of the case, there was still an underlying bias, or at least constructive
acknowledgment, that photography’s inherent differences had to somehow be
accommodated in order to reach the most appropriate decision. This accommodation is
dangerous in its relation to the primary discussion on obscenity, for if photography must
be treated differently, what is the likelihood that it would be afforded this same
accommodation in the realm of obscenity? In all likelihood, a varied approach would
work to photography’s disadvantage in the area of obscenity, particularly given common
perceptions of its stark objectivity.52
Another important copyright case involving a photograph, Gross v. Seligman,53
demonstrates further that despite the general acceptance that photography warrants
copyright protection, there exists an underlying bias against it. This is evidenced by the
51

See Farley, supra note 36, at 426-28 (recognizing that the Court, in order to reach its result of finding
authorship in photography, could not rely on more traditional rationalizations for copyright such as
acknowledging labor or innovation, but rather had to focus on the “human trace” in photography).
52
See infra part IV (discussing an additional obstacle to equal protection given the inherent realness of a
photograph and the effect of this perceived fidelity to reality on a viewer’s reaction to sexually explicit
photographs).
53
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17

proposition that despite the language in the opinion, the Second Circuit’s decision and
rationale in the case were influenced by the fact that the artistic medium involved was
photography. In Gross, the original photographer sold his copyright in a nude portrait
and then later used the same model in a similar pose for a portrait under a different title.54
The court ruled that the production of the second picture was an infringement on the
copyright of the first because there was strong indication that the artist used his talents
not to produce another picture, but rather to duplicate the original.55
While the Gross opinion begins with a reference to Burrow-Giles and suggests
that the court is treating the work as a photograph in the same way it would have had it
been a painting,56 the fact that the case involved a photograph still seems significant.
Given the historic criticism of photographs as being mere products of a machine and
copiers of reality, it is conceivable that a court would naturally think a photograph is
easier to reproduce than an oil painting. This could have affected the court’s distaste for
the actions of the original photographer – the court may have wanted to prevent the
cheapening of copyright by disallowing the artist to take a second bite of the apple, but
the court desired to come to its result even more because of the perceived ease of rephotographing something. This might explain why the court completely ignored
attaching any significance to the fact that the second photograph had a distinct title,
“Cherry Ripe,” that may have been a creative and original commentary on the first
photograph, “Grace of Youth.” Such an analysis may have led the court to come to a
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different result based on the fair use doctrine, though this possibility was apparently a
non-issue given the opinion’s complete lack of attention to it.
In the professional practice of photography, the general advice given to
photographers is to take caution when it comes to the issue of copyright. With respect to
the fair use defense in copyright law, the practical advice to photographers has been to
seek as much help as possible given the complexity of the area despite the law’s attempt
to define it.57 Photographers are also advised that the safest defense to copyright lawsuits
is to introduce as many variations in the photograph as artistically possible.58 But could
this be harder for the photographer than for the painter? Arguably with today’s
technology and the advent of digital photography, it would not be. Nonetheless, the
perception that a photograph is a literal translation of reality – and the law’s notice of this
perception – is an inescapable one for the artistic photographer. The obstacles that a
photographer faces in the realm of copyright illustrate its distinctiveness as an art form –
a distinctiveness that proves problematic beyond any single area of the law.

B. Invasion of Privacy and the Release
Another area of the law that suggests a varied approach to photography is that
involving the right of privacy. In the early days of photography when it met its harshest
and most widespread criticism, critics scorned the medium as being “predatory with
respect to people.”59 Photographic discourse in the mid-to-late nineteenth century on the
invention’s effect on modern society stressed its ability to make things more visible to the
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masses.60 Together, these general sentiments lay a foundation for the intersection of
photography and privacy rights. If a photograph did indeed capture the reality of a
person, and if technology allowed such information to reach more people, then it makes
sense that the invasion of privacy would become a greater concern. The ease of taking a
picture, the picture’s ability to reflect reality, and its dissemination in multiple facets of
society and culture made it that much more dangerous to one’s sense of privacy and
anonymity.
Issues on the right to privacy and the use of the release are relevant here in that
they reflect the uniqueness of photography as a medium. After all, the development of
laws recognizing the right to privacy stemmed from the era of yellow journalism and
excesses of the press – an era that was ultimately made possible by the advent of
photography and its widespread use.61 The nation’s first privacy law, embodied in
sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law,62 was enacted as a response to the
public’s outrage regarding a company’s use of a woman’s photograph in advertising and
the denial of a legal right to obtain damages for use of the photograph.63
Although the New York right of privacy statute does not differentiate between
various artistic media, but rather forbids use of a person’s name, portrait, or picture for
purposes of trade of advertising without that individual’s written consent,64 case law
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revealing the exceptions to the statute shed light on the law’s distinct approach to
photography in privacy law. Of particular relevance is the newsworthiness exception –
that is, if the image is editorial or newsworthy, it serves the public interest and thus falls
outside of the scope of the privacy statute.65 Because of its prevalent use in areas such as
journalism and the assumption that a photograph is the sole medium that can provide the
most direct representation of an event or object of reality, it would seem that photography
is more likely than other media to fall under this newsworthiness exception. In this
regard, photography’s inherent nature offers it differential treatment in the eyes of
privacy law. Of course, this favorable differential treatment does nothing for the
category of artistic photography, but rather only protects journalistic photography.
Whether these two types of photography should overlap and receive the same protection
is a separate issue beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the newsworthiness
exception in the law on privacy rights is but one area that reflects the relationship
between the nature of artistic medium and its effect on the law.
Another relevant aspect of the intersection of photography and privacy law that
evidences a distinct approach to photography involves the pending New York Supreme
Court case between Mr. Erno Nussenzweig, a Hasidic Jewish man, and the
internationally-acclaimed photographer Philip-Lorca diCorcia.66 The photograph in
dispute, “#13” of a larger collection entitled “Heads,” was taken by diCorcia in Times
Square and has since been sold in multiple prints for roughly $20,000 each.67 While
65
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Nussenzweig has sued pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law,
which apply to use of name or likeness regardless of artistic medium, the argument can
be made that the fact that this dispute involves a photograph, rather than a painting or
other art form, is critical.
For starters, if this were a painted portrait, the subject would have likely posed for
it, and would therefore be aware of the intended use of the work. It would be much
harder, or even impossible, for the painter to create a work similar to “#13” without
having the subject right in front of him, or at least seeing him for longer than the split
second it takes to shoot a photograph. In other words, the immediacy associated with
taking a photograph was what allowed diCorcia to capture the moment, and the
relationship of photography to technology was what allowed him to capture it from a
distance. Furthermore, Nussenzweig’s argument that he suffered “severe mental anguish,
emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment”68 may become more believable given
that his particular religion prohibits him from being photographed. Might these mediumspecific considerations, and the biased perception that a photograph is more “real” and
therefore more attached to the subject,69 affect the court’s outcome on this case, much in
line with the way early critics of photography found the medium so “predatory?”
Courts have struggled in their approach to photographs taken in public places
because the photographer is arguably presenting what was already open to public view.70
The general consensus is that there are situations in which privacy laws apply even in
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public.71 If this is the case, the only way to get around using a photograph in trade or
advertising is to obtain the subject’s written consent. This is done through the release.72
Yet in cases involving photography such as diCorcia’s, where the subject is meant to be
anonymous and the photograph is taken spontaneously without the subject’s knowledge,
obtaining any sort of formal release is difficult and burdensome. Arguably, the release is
most prevalent in the profession of photography,73 but to the extent that it is required for
art photographers like diCorcia, it is the least feasible.

C. The Realm of Child Pornography
A third pertinent area of law outside of obscenity, and perhaps the one that most
clearly shows a bias against photography due to its inherent nature, is that of child
pornography. Much of the literature surrounding the specific connection between
photography and obscenity frames the issue with respect to child pornography rather than
general artistic photography.74 Indeed, child pornography is perhaps the one area in
which it is least disputed that pornographic pictures of children are inappropriate,
harmful, offensive, and illegal.75
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It is noteworthy, however, that child pornography laws constitute a distinct set of
laws separate from obscenity laws. While child pornography laws mainly seek to protect
the subject, obscenity laws mainly seek to protect the audience. In one sense, obscenity
laws are more expansive than child pornography laws, in that the former applies to a
wider variety of works, while the latter focuses exclusively on pictures – either
photographic or live.76 In another sense, child pornography laws are more expansive than
obscenity laws in that the Millerstandard, including the third “value” prong, is
completely irrelevant to the determination of whether something constitutes child
pornography. Child pornography can therefore be banned even if it is not defined as
obscene under Miller.
In New York v. Ferber,77 the Supreme Court stated that child pornography is an
“exception to First Amendment freedoms because it exploits and abuses our nation’s
youth” and that child pornography can therefore be banned without regard to whether it
possesses value.78 The Court further emphasized that child pornography laws should be
limited exclusively to photographs and live performances or visual productions of live
performances, noting that the “distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual
conduct [of children], not otherwise obscene… retains First Amendment protection.”79
The rationale was that it is only in photography and film that there would be a true
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exploitation of the child, since the photograph or video reveals that there was an actual
child used in the work itself.80 Thus reveals a prime example of an area wherein the law
blatantly distinguishes between photography and other forms of art such as painting,
drawing, sculpture and so forth.
The need to take a distinct approach to photography as compared with other forms
of art in the area of child pornography also presents itself clearly in the more recent
Supreme Court case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.81 The issue in this case was
whether “virtual child” pornography, involving completely fictional subjects in which no
actual child was used in the production process, could be criminalized under child
pornography laws. The Court held that the government could not criminalize such
activity because it did not constitute sexual abuse of any child.82 While Congress, in
direct response to the Court’s decision, proposed new legislation in an attempt to
proscribe virtual child pornography,83 the approach by the Court on the issue is quite
clear: child pornography laws should remain true to Ferber’s intent and be limited to
photographs or live productions or reproductions of actual children.
The Court’s outcome on the issue of virtual child pornography is analogous to the
distinction between a photograph and a painting. A painting that does not involve a child
model, but is rather conjured up by the artist’s imagination, is “virtual.” Only a
photograph, not a drawing or painting or sculpture, definitively and without dispute uses
a real-life subject. Therefore, in the realm of child pornography law, it is the sexually
80
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explicit photograph involving a minor that can be criminally charged, not an alternative
art form whose relation to a subject is treated as more tenuous. The basis of this
differential treatment – that a photograph is inherently more tangible and true, ever filial
to reality – brings the discussion back to the realm of obscenity and lays the foundation
for the final piece of the puzzle illustrating the artistic photographer’s struggle with
contemporary obscenity standards.

IV.

OBSCENITY AND THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: PHOTOGRAPHY’S INHERENT
NATURE AND THE CAPTURING OF OBJECTIVE TRUTH

Courts and audiences are more likely to find sexually explicit photographs
obscene not only because it may be harder to find that a photograph possesses “serious
artistic value,” or because there is evidence that courts treat photography differently in a
variety of areas outside of obscenity law, but perhaps most intuitively because a
photograph is perceived as capturing something inherently more real. The objectivity of
photography and its “fidelity to appearances”84 relates back to the earlier discussion on
the marginalization of photography as art. While that discussion focused on the effects
that the ease of taking a photograph and the multi-functionality of photography had on
the third prong of Miller, 85 the discussion at hand focuses on the first two prongs of
Miller: those relating to the “prurient interest” and whether the work exhibits se xual
conduct in a “patently offensive” way. I argue here that the myth of photographic
realism leads to a higher likelihood that a sexually explicit photograph will be deemed to
satisfy these two prongs of Miller. This analysis thereby completes the proposition that
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photography’s inherent nature has a restrictive effect with respect to each element of the
Millerobscenity test .
Photography’s dependence on machinery was only part of the reason critics
scoffed at its value as art. The other part of the reason for the marginalization of
photography dealt with the assertion that a photograph simply reflected reality and was
therefore not an expression of personality or human soul.86 In this sense, it was inferior
to painting and other traditional forms of art, and artists and critics were quick to lament
the permeation of the new invention into the field of art.87 A photograph merely represented nature, and its verisimilitude made it transparent and less worthy of artistic
acclaim.88 Deemed “the pencil of nature,”89 photography was seen as deplorably
plagiaristic of reality: a photograph’s sole merit was its accuracy, nothing more.90
It is precisely this understanding of photography’s ability to capture reality and
offer an exact duplication of a real object or scene that makes a sexually explicit
photograph more readily offensive. In the eyes of the viewer, photography is the one
medium that can accomplish this duplication of reality, and for this, it has a dangerously
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powerful effect.91 As American commentator Susan Sontag writes: “Photography
furnishes evidence. Something we hear about, but doubt, seems proven when we’re
shown a photograph of it.”92
This perception and understanding of photography was what justified the
Supreme Court’s continued support of Ferber in its limitation of child pornography laws
to actual photographs or videos of real children. The objectivity of a photograph makes
the subject more real to the viewer, and the mental association of the final product to the
subject invokes a specific reaction. In the realm of child pornography, that reaction
generally reflects disgust. But the same line of reasoning transfers to the realm of
obscenity. Depictions of sexual conduct between individuals or the “lewd exhibition of
the genitals”93 through photography has a higher tendency of offending because it was an
actual person in that photograph, committing that act. When the viewer completes the
inevitable mental processing of the image and conceptualizes its close relation to real life,
it becomes that much more “hard core.” This only builds upon and deepens the earlier
assertion regarding photography’s initial obstacle to First Amendment protection as a
visual image.94
The perception that photography blatantly duplicates reality thus proves to be a
double-edged sword: it hinders its consideration as possessing “serious artistic value” for
purposes of falling outside the realm of obscenity and into the realm of works meriting
91
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First Amendment protection, and it also makes a photograph more real for purposes of
satisfying the other two prongs of the Millertest. Even if a sexually explicit photograph
is considered “aesthetic” or in some other way deserving of distinction as art, the
question remains whether it is serious art, and the problem remains that an average
viewer naturally associates sexual connotations with the mere image of a nude95 –
thereby opening up the possibility that the work is obscene. In sum, photography’s
mechanically truthful nature is detrimental to the freedom of sexually explicit art
photographers with respect to each element of the obscenity consideration.
The effect of photography’s objective nature and its connection to the individual
subject of (i.e. person in) the photograph were previously relevant in the discussions on
the right of privacy and child pornography.96 In the realm of obscenity, the realness of a
photograph and its attachment to the subject being photographed make the work more
striking, shocking, realistic, and resultantly more “patently offensive.” Moreover, to the
“average person” applying “contemporary community standards,” these distinct
characteristics – ones that simply cannot exist in painting, drawing, or sculpture in the
way they do in photography – render the work more likely to appeal to the “prurient
interest.” As Sontag further writes:
“While a painting, even one that meets photographic standards of
resemblance, is never more than the stating of an interpretation, a
photograph is never less than the registering of an emanation… – a
material vestige of its subject in a way that no painting can be.”97
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The impact of photography’s inherently objective qualities on the satisfaction of
the elements of obscenity are not only evident in modern discourses on photography as
well as certain case law,98 but also in our culture of consumption. After all, modern
popular pornography exists primarily in the form of photography or film. One would
venture to say that consumers of pornography prefer photographs to drawings or
paintings. The latter are less satisfying because they don’t seem as realistic, or as tied to
a real person. To the consumer of pornography, a sexual fantasy, though fantasy, still
requires an element of reality. This preference makes the line between sexually explicit
photography as art and sexually explicit photography as pornography evermore blurred.
It is a dilemma that plagues the art photographer to a far greater extent than the painter or
other more traditional artist.99
The notion of photographic realism, however, is somewhat a myth, given both
photography’s historical development as a fine art and its close relationship with
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certain classical nude paintings were legal and classified as pure nudes rather than impure ones, but
photographic reproductions of the same works were ruled obscene. American artists and critics, in line
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technology. Historically, photographers tried to mimic the technical and artistic styles of
paintings in order to earn recognition as a worthy art.100 During the reign of pictorialism
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, art photographers felt the need to adopt an
abstract, painterly approach to their work in order to obtain legitimacy in the world of
fine art. Pictorialists believed that the artistic photograph should be judged using the
same principles as those used to judge other artistic media such as paintings and prints.101
To make photographs appear more like paintings, art photographers often manipulated
images by hand, deliberately making them blurred and abstract, or applied other technical
modifications such as a softer focus and backlighting to achieve a similar painting-like
result.102 Early photographers of the nude made use of similar techniques, including use
of veils and impersonal poses, in order to avoid sexuality in the same way paintings and
sculptures traditionally mythologized and idealized the classic nude.103
These attempts to render photography more similar to traditional forms of art,
later discouraged by Purists and Photo Secessionists in a subsequent movement,104
demonstrate the lengths taken by early art photographers to overcome a stigma and
achieve validation. Perhaps more significantly, however, they indicate that photography
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is not always literal, and that it never has been.105 Never could this be more the case in
today’s era of digital photography. As technology continues to advance, allowing for the
drastic alteration of images be it on the computer or in the darkroom, the notion that all
photography is inherently a duplication of reality is simply not true. As such, modern
courts and audiences should perhaps rethink their reaction to a sexually explicit
photograph to the extent that it may not be so different from a painting, drawing, or other
traditional medium after all.

V.

LOOKING FORWARD: STRIVING FOR AN EQUAL OBSCENITY STANDARD AND THE
LIMITS ON EXPANDED FREEDOM FOR THE ART PHOTOGRAPHER

In order to overcome a negative bias against the freedom of photographers with
respect to producing sexually explicit photographs, one solution is for courts and
audiences to be more cognizant of the myth of photographic realism. Part of that would
involve a more ready realization that photographs do not always reflect reality and can be
altered and recreated at the artist’s whim just like a painting, virtual digital image,
drawing, or sculpture. Yet this possibility lends itself to an alternative problem: the
implicit requirement that a photograph somehow purposely possess an abstract or
aesthetic quality.
As applied to modern obscenity law, it seems that the pictorialist approach would
have helped shield many sexually explicit photographs from being deemed obscene. The
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more abstract, indistinct, and unreal a work of art, the less likely it is to satisfy the first
two prongs of Miller. 106 On the same token, it is arguable that the more abstract,
aesthetic, and painting-like a work, the more likely it is to satisfy the third prong of Miller
and thus ensure protection by the First Amendment.107 This brings into question whether
photographs that are sexually explicit must somehow possess a special abstract aesthetic
quality in order to be considered less offensive and more artistic. In addition to the
“formalistic” opposing diagonals and “almost classical” compositions of Robert
Mapplethorpe’s photographs, for example, most of his most controversial works were
also shown as black and white photography, arguably making it less real, and perhaps
more “artsy” than colored photography. Indeed, the historical marginalization of
photography based on treatment of colored photographic reproductions focused on the
notion that colored photographs might have a certain cheapening effect and also appeal to
a baser, more “prurient” interest.108
Does this mean that an art photographer whose work features a sexually explicit
nude (or nudes) in a potentially obscene way should try extra hard to make the work look
more “artistic,” perhaps by using a more classical composition, smudging and blurring
outlines, using a softer focus, making it less true to reality – all the things that the
pictorialist felt the need to do and that the purist advised against? Surely, a painter was
never forced to use black and white paint in order to make his painting of a provocative
nude more “artistic,” less “real,” and therefore less obscene.
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The dilemma as to whether modern-day art photographers have to make their
work more “beautiful” or “artistic” in order to escape obscenity charges surfaces again in
the Ninth Circuit case, Miller v. United States.109 The court in that case emphasized how
the lack of any “attempt at artistic composition either in background, surroundings or
poses” justified the finding that the work was obscene.110 Yet, going back to the initial
problem of defining art and artistic value, what does “good photography” even mean, and
who best decides? And what of the Post-Modern art photographer whose purpose is to
defy all classical technique and traditional standards, perhaps by deliberately taking the
purist’s approach to artistic photography to an extreme? Would the product be protected
art, or unprotected obscenity? These are all problems that continually limit the freedom of
the photographer, particularly the photographer who chooses as part of his art to more
literally exhibit sexual conduct, in producing sexually explicit photographic images for
the sake of art.

CONCLUSION
Ideally, art photographers should not be further restricted merely because of
inherent biases and preconceptions regarding their chosen medium. However, the power
of the photographic image, the indefiniteness of what constitutes art and what warrants
serious artistic value, the multitude of functions outside of art associated with
photography, the historical marginalization of photography as art, the biases against the
medium exhibited in distinct areas of the law, and its perceived accuracy as a vehicle for
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an objective reality – all result in a profound and perhaps inescapable impact on the art
photographer.
We are not yet at a point in which we automatically reason that a photograph may
not actually reflect reality, or that it is unfair that the art photographer, and not the painter
or sculptor, be subjected to our prejudicial notions about the medium.

Until the

common juror, the judge, and the viewers and critics of artistic photography at large do
embrace these nuances in the relationship between photography and obscenity, the art
photographer will likely continue to struggle, to a greater extent than other artists, in the
face of the nation’s standards on obscenity.
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